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Abstract: 
This paper examines the profitability of Division I athletic programs at colleges and 
universities in the United States under a variety of accounting definitions of profit. The data 
identify several broad themes. First, a majority of athletic departments rely heavily on direct and 
indirect subsidization of their programs by the student body, the institution itself, and state 
governments in order to balance their books. Without such funding, less than a third of BCS 
athletic departments and no non-BCS departments are in the black. Second, athletic programs 
rely heavily on contributions to balance their books. Donations to athletic departments may serve 
as a substitute for donations to the rest of the university, lowering giving to other programs. 
Third, football and men’s basketball programs are generally highly profitable at BCS schools, but 
below this top tier, fewer than 10% of football programs and 15% of men’s basketball programs 
show a profit by any reasonable accounting measures. 
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Introduction and Data 
 
Athletic departments and intercollegiate sports are important and highly visible 
components of the majority of colleges and universities in the United States. Football and 
basketball teams often serve as the public face for major institutions of higher education. It is 
also generally believed that athletic programs serve as major revenue sources for their 
institutions. The purpose of this paper is to examine the revenues and expenses of major 
university athletic programs to determine the extent to which athletic programs either generate 
revenue or impose costs upon host institutions. 
Detailed revenue and expense accounts certified by independent auditors are typically not 
available for college athletic programs for several reasons. First, even though the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), 
and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issue reporting and auditing 
standards and guidelines for institutions of higher education, the standards are different from 
those required of publicly traded corporations. Second, a large number of the country’s colleges 
and universities are private, not-for-profit institutions, and therefore again are subject to different 
accounting standards. Third, athletics are simply one division within a larger entity. In general, 
even those institutions with strict reporting requirements are not required to provide revenue and 
expense details for every individual operational unit within the business. For example, while 
Apple is legally required to provide financial statements for its business overall, it is not required 
to break down how its profits are earned between computers, software, media, and consumer 
electronics. 
While much research has been conducted on the indirect benefits of having sports 
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programs, little has been conducted on the direct benefits of having intercollegiate sports 
programs.  The few studies that have been conducted and cited here (Skousen and Condie (1988), 
 Borland, Goff and Pulsinelli (1992), Goff (2004)) all agree that determining the actual direct 
benefits of operating a particular sports program is a difficult process. Due to the not-for-profit 
environment of universities and their unique accounting procedures, accurately determining the 
financial profit or loss from athletic programs requires an intimate knowledge of a specific 
university’s detailed accounts and accounting conventions. In calculating profit or loss it is 
necessary to consider the relevant or marginal revenues and expenses, those revenues that would 
not be received and those expenses that would not be incurred without the program. Adjustments 
are also needed for valuing grant-in-aid expenses at their true incremental cost, and attributing 
athletic-produced revenues and expenses to athletic accounts.  The discrepancy between the 
reported and actual financial impact of sports programs is also due to internal transfer pricing 
practices. For example, an athlete’s grant-in-aid expenditure for the athletic department 
represents revenue for another operating function of the university, so the athletic expenditure is 
not the true cost to the university. Another mitigating factor is that some expenditures that are 
treated as necessary costs, more accurately reflect excess budgeting revenue that needed to be 
used, as directors of operating functions in a university setting do not have a profit motivating 
incentive. 
Skousen and Condie (1988) developed a model to evaluate the revenues and expenses of 
the athletic program at Utah State University in order to determine whether it was advisable to 
drop the football program which, according to university accounting procedures, ran at an 
operating deficit.  The model utilized a cause and effect basis for allocating revenues and 
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expenses. The authors identified direct revenues and expenses for each sport and used an 
allocation method for the indirect revenues and expenses (based on number of athletes, number 
of tickets sold, etc.). The authors found that dropping the football program at Utah State 
University would not eliminate the financial problems of the athletic program, and in fact would 
lead to more financial pressures. Borland, Goff and Pulsinelli (1992) used Western Kentucky 
University as a model for evaluating the direct benefits of an athletic program. They analyzed the 
economic impact of the marginal revenues and marginal costs of the entire athletic program, 
football, men’s basketball and other sports. Their marginal revenues and costs were calculated 
based on what revenues and costs would be eliminated without the sports program as a whole, 
and then for specific sports programs, paying particular attention to marginal vs. sunk costs 
(those incurred whether or not there is a particular sport).  They also included the issue of general 
student enrollment impacts in their analysis. They found that Western Kentucky University’s 
athletic program was a net contributor to school revenues.  Goff (2004) noted that reports have 
estimated that many university athletic programs, even big-time programs, operate at a loss. He 
addresses this assertion by adjusting the athletic profit and loss figures, for 109 NCAA Division I 
schools, reported by Sheehan (1996), for various accounting issues such as valuing grant-in-aid 
expenses at their incremental cost, and attributing athletic-produced revenues and expenses to 
athletic accounts, and finds that only 10% of schools lost money, 79% of schools had at least $1 
million in profits, with 72% exceeding $2 million in profits.  
Several sources of financial data for collegiate athletic programs are available. Most 
prominent is the annual Equity in Athletics Disclosure report compiled for all colleges and 
universities in the United States with athletic programs by the Department of Education’s Office 
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of Postsecondary Education (OPE). While data specific to each individual school is available for 
every school with intercollegiate athletic teams at any level of competition, unfortunately, the 
required data submitted to the OPE is not sufficiently detailed, especially on the revenue side, to 
permit any reasonable analysis of the revenues truly generated by sports programs.  
The other major source of athletic program financial data is the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association’s (NCAA) annual Revenues and Expenses of Division I Intercollegiate 
Athletics Programs Report. This lengthy report collects detailed data regarding revenues and 
expenses broken down into 15 revenue categories and 19 expense categories for every academic 
year for each of the over 300 colleges and universities with Division I athletic programs, the 
highest level of intercollegiate competition in the U.S. As opposed to the OPE data, the revenue 
and expense data is sufficiently disaggregated to allow reasonable analysis, but the problem with 
the NCAA data is that the NCAA does not release data for individual schools and reports, only 
averages, as well as values at the 25%, 50%, and 75% quartiles for all Division I schools. See 
Table 1 for a sample of the types of data that are collected. 
Ideally, one would like detailed expense and revenue data for each individual school. The 
OPE provides aggregated expense and revenue data for individual schools while the NCAA 
provides detailed expense and revenue data for aggregated schools. Fortunately, at least two 
media organizations have used Freedom of Information Act requests to compel public 
universities to release the detailed financial information they submitted to the NCAA as part of 
the Revenues and Expenses of Division I Intercollegiate Athletics Programs Report. USA Today 
has collected data for roughly 200 schools for the years 2004-2009 for overall athletic program 
costs and revenues. As noted previously, this detailed data includes revenues and expenses 
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broken down into 15 revenue categories and 19 expense categories. The Indianapolis Star 
newspaper obtained the data originally submitted to the NCAA for the 2004-05 academic year 
only, but unique to the Star, within each category, all revenues and expenses were allocated 
across 5 designated areas:  football, men’s basketball, women’s basketball, other sports, and non-
program specific. As noted by the Indianapolis Star (but also echoed by USA Today), “The 
numbers are presented here as they were reported to the NCAA. No attempt was made to change 
or research anomalies. The NCAA does that. Despite improvements in accounting procedures, 
schools still differ in how they report certain information.” 
Given the ability to examine revenues and expenses within individual sports, it is the 
Indianapolis Star data that will be examined in depth here. The data were obtained through 
Freedom of Information requests to the 215 public schools that competed in Division 1 athletics, 
the highest level of intercollegiate competition, during the 2004-05 school year. Of this number, 
164 schools complied with the request.  In addition, 112 private schools also compete in Division 
1, but these schools were under no obligation to comply and none did. See Table 2 for a list of 
the included schools.  
While the 164 schools examined in this paper represent only a fraction of the total 
number of colleges with athletic programs, it does include a majority of the schools with what 
would normally be considered “big-time” programs. The sample includes 51 of the 72 teams in 
one of the six largest athletics conferences in the country, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac-10, Southeast 
Conference, Big East, and Atlantic Coast Conference, also known as the Bowl Championship 
Series (BCS) conferences. The sample also includes 46 of the 50 largest schools in terms of 
average football attendance and 37 of the 50 largest schools in terms of average basketball 
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attendance. 
It is also important to note that this study will only address the direct costs and benefits of 
athletic programs. Obviously, sports teams may have large indirect costs and benefits that do not 
show up on the bottom line. On the benefits side, numerous articles have explored the impact of 
athletic success on measures such as applications (McCormick and Tinsley, 1987; Borland, Goff 
and Pulsinelli (1992); Tucker and Amato, 1993; Murphy and Trandel, 1994; Toma and Cross, 
1996; Goff, 2004; and Tucker, 2005; Pope and Pope 2009), graduation rates (Tucker, 1992; 
2004; Amato, Gandar, and Zuber, 2001, and Rishe, 2003), and alumni giving (Siegelman and 
Carter, 1979; Siegelman and Brookheimer, 1983; Baade and Sundberg, 1994; Grimes and 
Chressanthins, 1994; and Rhoads and Gerking, 2000; Humphreys and Mondello, 2007). These 
studies report mixed effects from athletic success, and in those cases where benefits are 
identifiable, the effects are generally small. Of course, in all of these studies, the authors examine 
only the effect of athletic success on other variables, not the effect of the presence of an 
intercollegiate athletic program itself on these variables.   
On the other side of the coin, critics of college sports suggest that big-time athletics, in 
particular, undermine the academic mission of colleges and universities. As noted by Matheson 
(2007), the athletes themselves “take easier (and sometimes academically worthless) courses, are 
graded less severely, and perform worse than their peers in the classroom despite the availability 
of special academic services, such as private tutoring, available only to athletes.”  Athletics also 
potentially distracts attention from learning among the general student population. [See Sperber 
(2000), Shulman and Bowen (2001), Bowen and Levin (2003) and Fizel and Smaby (2004) 
among others.] 
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Of course, while the indirect costs and benefits of athletics are very important to consider, 
there is a notable lack of specific knowledge about the direct costs and benefits of athletic 
program which this paper attempts to address.  
 
Accounting for Profits 
While the idea of profits is conceptually easy, from an accounting standpoint, accurately 
measuring profits is not as simple as it first appears. This paper will report average profits for 
BCS schools, non-BCS schools with football, and non-BCS schools without football for the 
athletic programs overall, as well as for men’s and women’s basketball and men’s football under 
a variety of different definitions of profit. While there are a handful of BCS schools without 
football teams (e.g. St. John’s and Seton Hall), none appear in this sample. In addition, the 
number of teams that report a profit in each sport, as well as the profit for the overall program are 
reported. 
The first measure of profit recorded in Table 3 is simply total reported revenues less total 
reported expenses. By this measure, athletic programs are highly profitable for major programs; 
football and basketball make money at major programs but not at smaller programs, and athletic 
programs overall are profitable at most (117 of 166) institutions, regardless of size. 
This initial measure of profitability is unappealing, however, as it includes a variety of 
subsidies as revenues. Student fees assessed to students, direct support from the institution or the 
state government, and indirect support from the institution are all counted as revenues in the 
same way that ticket and concessions sales are counted. The second measure of profitability 
shown in Table 4 excludes these subsidies from revenues. The NCAA designates the remaining 
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revenues as “generated revenues”. The exclusion of subsidies paints an entirely different picture 
of the profitability of college athletics. Football and basketball programs at BCS schools still tend 
to be highly profitable at nearly every school, but athletic programs overall lose money at even 
the largest institutions. Even with football generating in excess of $50 million per year at the 
highest revenue institutions, athletic departments only broke even at 15 of the 166 schools in the 
sample and overall lost nearly $6 million on average. At non-BCS schools, even football and 
basketball rarely break even, and athletics overall show a deficit at every school.   
Athletic programs are often supported by generous voluntary contributions by alumni and 
fans. Donations to the athletic department averaged $4.5 million for the schools in the sample 
and exceeded $10 million at nearly 1 out of the 6 schools surveyed. While athletic departments 
may increase contributions to the university, donations designated specifically to the athletic 
department may actually reduce donations to the rest of the school by causing potential donors to 
substitute away from the general fund to the athletic department. The magnitude of this 
substitution effect is unknown and generally unexplored in the academic literature, but anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the pool of general fund donors may be distinctly different from athletic 
donors. That being said, the measure of profit shown in Table 5 assumes that athletic donations 
are perfect substitutes for other contributions and shows profit generated as revenues less 
contributions less total expenses. By this measure, major football and basketball programs 
remain largely profitable, but athletic programs overall lose money at an average of over $10 
million per institution and but a single college athletic program, the University of Michigan, 
operates in the black by this measure. 
The final measure of profit attempts to allocate expenses and revenues across sports in a 
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more reasonable fashion. Under the accounting methods used to report expenses and revenues to 
the NCAA, a large portion of both expenses and revenues are not allocated to specific sports. For 
example, an average of $9.7 million of the $23.5 million in total revenues (including subsidies) 
generated by the average athletic program is not allocated to a specific team and $9.0 million of 
the $22.8 million in expenses is not allocated to a specific team. Table 6 shows profit generated 
as revenues less expenses, with all non-program specific revenues and expenses allocated across 
teams based on the number of athletes in each specific sport. Obviously, this is not an ideal 
methodology for all accounts, but it can be used as an approximation. As seen in Table 6, this 
accounting method serves to reduce average profits within basketball and football by about 10%. 
One other appealing measure of profit is not reported in the paper due to data difficulties, 
but at least the conceptual issues can be addressed. The reported expenses for student aid likely 
over-estimate the cost of the athletic program to colleges and universities. Student aid includes 
athletically related financial aid given to student athletes. Financial aid to athletes is considered a 
payment by the athletic department to other university functions (internal transfer payments) 
where the marginal cost could be at or near zero. To determine the actual costs to the university, 
the incremental costs incurred as a result of providing services in each receiving department must 
be determined (Skousen and Condie (1988), Goff (2004)). If a college is not at capacity, the 
incremental cost of adding a small number of scholarship athletes is likely to be significantly less 
than the full-tuition scholarship that is reflected on the universities books since the student would 
fit into existing classes and housing (Borland, Goff and Pulsinelli (1992). Indeed, if the athlete at 
a below-capacity institution is offered only a half-tuition scholarship (athletes are commonly 
offered student aid packages that are a fraction of full tuition), paying the remaining tuition him 
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or herself, the school’s revenues will increase due to the tuition payment by the athlete, and the 
school’s profits may actually rise if the marginal cost of accommodating the athlete is sufficiently 
low. Of course, as noted previously, attracting prospective students, many of whom may be 
athletes, is one reason to have an athletic program in the first place. 
Of course, while adding one additional student in an under-utilized college may be 
costless at the margin, few schools offer open enrollment to all applicants, suggesting that at a 
large percentage of colleges and universities, other paying students would have taken the place of 
the admitted athlete. Furthermore, athletic programs can be quite large, with up to one thousand 
student athletes. At small colleges with large athletic programs, the percentage of the study body 
participating in intercollegiate athletics can exceed 20%. Clearly, with such numbers, athletic 
programs cannot generally be considered to operate at the margins of enrollment, and average 
cost per student is likely to be a relatively accurate measure of the marginal cost of the student 
athletes in the program as a whole. 
Further complicating the matter is the fact that non-athletes also commonly receive 
financial aid. In the case of an institution that is near capacity, in the absence of student athletes, 
presumably the other students who would have attended the university in their place would have 
likely received financial aid. The true net cost of the student aid given to athletes should not be 
the total cost of student athlete financial aid, but instead the incremental cost between the average 
aid package given to an athlete, compared to the average aid package given to a non-athlete. 
Obviously, the full ride scholarships given to promising players in major sports programs will 
exceed the typical financial aid package given to a regular student, but the average non-athlete 
still imposes financial aid costs upon the institution.   
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A simple numerical example illustrates some of the various scenarios that must be 
considered, and the difficulties involved in estimating the true cost of athletic scholarship aid. 
Suppose a university’s full tuition is $20,000 and that the average athlete receives an $11,000 
scholarship. The question to an economist or an accountant is, “What is the net cost to the 
institution of an athlete?” Under the accounting methodology used by most NCAA programs, the 
$11,000 scholarship is treated as an $11,000 expense for student aid.  The true net cost is much 
harder to disentangle.  
Under the methodology of Borland, Goff and Pulsinelli (1992), at an institution that is 
below capacity, the university should be credited with revenues of $9,000, the remainder of the 
athlete’s tuition not covered by scholarship, less the marginal cost of providing the athlete with 
an education at the institution, which they argue is typically low. Rather than placing a cost on 
the university, the athlete actually may generate tuition revenues in excess of the marginal cost of 
his or her education.  Mathematically, net cost = student aid – full tuition + marginal cost. Net 
cost will be negative, representing a gain rather than a cost to the university, if the net tuition 
remaining after student aid is offered, is larger than the marginal cost of providing education.    
 One should not be so quick to presume low marginal costs of education services provided 
to student athletes, however. As noted previously, athletic programs will often be large enough 
that it is not reasonable to presume that each athlete can be treated as a student at the margin. 
Furthermore, on the assumption that a college or university has made a conscious decision about 
optimal class sizes, adding students will quickly result in significant additional costs to the 
university in order to bring class sizes back to optimum, or alternatively the larger class sizes 
impose implicit costs on other students and faculty. Therefore, in the context of the athletic 
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department or sports teams as a whole, in many cases it would be more reasonable to assume a 
cost per athlete closer to the average cost of education rather than a low marginal cost.  Of 
course, such an assumption will result in costs much closer to the price of full tuition. In 
addition, due to funds provided by donors, endowment or investment returns, grant money, and 
state appropriations at many colleges and universities, the average cost for educating a student is 
well in excess of the full-tuition price. To summarize, if the average cumulative marginal cost of 
providing educational services to a group of athletes is equal to the average cost of providing 
education to the student body as a whole, and if the average cost is equal to full tuition, then the 
net cost of athletic aid is simply equal to the size of the student aid award.  Otherwise, the 
average cumulative marginal cost of educating a group of athletes may be either above or below 
full tuition, depending on the specific conditions of the institution.     
The preceding argument has assumed that a scholarship athlete will simply be added to 
the student body as a whole, while at any institution with selective admissions a student athlete 
will simply displace another student. The fact that other students may also receive financial aid, 
however, serves to provide a further complication. Suppose a typical student at the previous 
hypothetical university receives $5,000 in scholarship aid while the average athlete still receives 
an $11,000 athletic scholarship. Again, for NCAA purposes, the $11,000 scholarship is treated as 
an $11,000 athletic expense for student aid, but the true net cost is more complicated. 
Because the athlete displaces a non-athlete student, admitting the athlete should be treated 
as an opportunity cost, as the university has foregone the opportunity to admit a student who 
could pay up to $20,000 in tuition. In practice, however, the foregone student is likely to pay only 
$15,000 in tuition versus the $9,000 in tuition that the scholarship athlete pays. The true cost of 
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the athlete’s scholarship is not the $11,000 reported as financial aid, but instead is the difference 
between the average student aid award to the athlete less the average student aid awarded to the 
non-athlete, or $6,000 in this case. Because student athletes are eligible for any scholarship 
awards provided to students in general, and are also eligible for student aid based on athletic 
ability, unless athletes are drawn from significantly different populations than non-athletes, the 
average athletic student aid award will be larger than the average non-athlete scholarship. It also 
stands to reason, however, that the net cost of athletic aid in comparison to the average displaced 
student is smaller than the figures reported to the NCAA. 
With the data available from the sources used in this paper, it is impossible to estimate 
the average cost  or marginal cost of providing educational opportunities for student athletes, and 
it is similarly impossible to estimate the difference between the average financial aid package 
offered to athletes and non-athletes at the colleges and universities examined to any degree of 
accuracy. In order to provide some context, however, Table 7 provides profitability data for the 
schools in the sample assuming student aid costs of zero and including only generated revenues 
in profit calculations (analogous to Table 4). Under this assumption, one of two things must be 
true. Either (1) the average scholarship award for a non-athlete is the same as that for an athlete 
(in the case of schools at capacity); or (2) the average marginal cost of educating all athletes at 
the school is equal to the average remaining tuition paid by athletes after the award of student aid 
(in the case of schools below capacity).   
As noted previously, Borland, Goff and Pulsinelli (1992) would argue that in some cases 
student athletes might actually generate positive tuition revenue in excess of educational costs, so 
these figures do not represent a theoretical upper bound for program profitability. Similarly, if the 
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average non-athlete commands more student aid than the typical athlete, again these figures do 
not represent a theoretical upper bound for program profitability. Nevertheless, for most 
reasonable assumptions regarding student aid, these figures represent the maximum profit level 
that could be ascribed to an athletic program, and likely significantly overestimate profit just as 
the comparable figures in Table 4 serve to underestimate profits.  
As can be seen in Table 7, even when the costs of student aid are completely excluded 
from athletic program budgets, the story is quite similar to that described earlier. When subsidies 
and transfers are excluded from athletic department revenues and only generated revenues are 
counted, football and basketball programs at BCS schools again tend to be highly profitable at 
nearly every school. In addition, athletic programs at BCS schools break even more often than 
not, with 41 out of 51 BCS athletic departments showing an average profit of over $4 million. 
Outside the BCS, however, even with the most generous treatment of student aid, 112 out of the 
remaining 115 athletic departments failed to generate revenues sufficient to cover their expenses, 
and even in the top revenue sports of football and men’s basketball showed a profit in only about 
20% of cases. Again, even if the costs of athletic scholarships are completely excluded from 
consideration, athletic departments outside the top conferences are a net drain on the finance 
resources of their host institutions. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper examines the profitability of Division I athletic programs at colleges and 
universities in the United States under a variety of accounting definitions of profit. The data 
identify several broad themes. First, a majority of athletic departments rely heavily on direct and 
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indirect subsidization of their programs by the student body, the institution itself, and state 
governments in order to balance their books. Without such funding, less than a third of BCS 
athletic departments and no non-BCS departments are in the black. Second, athletic programs 
rely heavily on contributions to balance their books. Donations to athletic department may serve 
as a substitute for donations to the rest of the university, lowering giving to other programs. 
Third, football and men’s basketball programs are generally highly profitable at BCS schools, but 
below this top tier, fewer than 10% of football programs and 15% of men’s basketball programs 
make money. Finally, properly accounting for expenditures on financial aid to student athletes is 
highly problematic, but even excluding the cost of athletic scholarships from athletic 
departments’ financial statements does not alter the conclusion that profits are rare at schools that 
compete at a level below the major BCS schools, even in the revenue sports of basketball and 
football. 
It is important to note that revenue generation is not the sole or even perhaps the primary 
reason for colleges and universities to host intercollegiate athletic programs. Athletics provide 
students a valuable entertainment option, and participation in sports can be thought of as an 
educational experience in and of itself. Athletic competitions allow alumni to connect with their 
alma mater in a tangible manner and raise the visibility of the college to both funding agencies 
and the public in general (Humphreys, 2006). However, it is also beyond question that many see 
intercollegiate sports programs as a cash cow for colleges and universities, and this paper clearly 
shows that these widely held beliefs are generally false. Under most reasonable accounting 
measures, athletic programs typically fail to provide significant revenues in excess of 
expenditures, even at the largest and most successful universities. At smaller colleges, athletics 
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are a net cost to the institution, and even the so-called revenue sports of football and men’s 
basketball require subsidies to balance their books. While there are potentially many good 
reasons to have an athletic program, profit generation is not one of them. 
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Table 1:  Sample Detailed Revenues and Expenses for Appalachian State 
 
Revenues Football  
Men’s 
Basketball 
Women’s 
Basketball Other 
Non 
Program 
Specific Total 
Ticket Sales $404,216  $52,283  $1,781  $0  $0  $458,280  
Student Fees $0  $0  $0  $0  $4,360,796  $4,360,796  
Guarantees $175,000  $150,000  $12,500  $10,100  $0  $347,600  
Contributions $28,310  $10,865  $10,765  $46,813  $748,873  $845,626  
Third Party Support $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
Government Support $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
Direct Institutional Support $7,557  $5,700  $1,900  $125,461  $37,351  $177,969  
Indirect Institutional Support $0  $0  $0  $0  $320,736  $320,736  
NCAA/Conference Distributions $0  $0  $0  $2,326  $362,655  $364,981  
Individual School Media Rights $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
Concessions, Programs, Parking $53,964  $0  $0  $0  $6,885  $60,849  
Advertisements & Sponsorship $0  $0  $225  $0  $349,382  $349,607  
Sports Camps $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
Endowments/Investments $0  $0  $540  $36,955  $24,616  $62,111  
Other Revenues $9,500  $4,220  $0  $56,261  $215,695  $285,676  
Subtotal $678,547  $223,068  $27,711  $277,916  $6,426,989  $7,634,231  
       
Expenses Football  
Men's 
Basketball 
Women's 
Basketball Other 
Non 
Program 
Specific Total 
Student Aid $888,027  $183,575  $221,341  $950,803  $0  $2,243,746  
Guarantees $50,000  $7,500  $250  $0  $0  $57,750  
Salaries $527,997  $241,799  $199,102  $894,689  $0  $1,863,587  
Other Coaches' Comp. $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
Support Staff Salaries $0  $0  $0  $0  $1,178,454  $1,178,454  
Other Support Staff Comp $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
Severence Payments $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
Recruiting $77,449  $46,082  $37,740  $59,369  $44,146  $264,786  
Team Travel $74,237  $56,301  $48,406  $295,753  $118,172  $592,869  
Equipment $103,812  $21,031  $20,988  $147,528  $91,744  $385,103  
Game Expenses $43,975  $36,615  $23,516  $42,661  $0  $146,767  
Promotion $0  $0  $0  $1,630  $88,101  $89,731  
Sports Camp $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
Facilities, Maintenance $5,279  $8  $394  $4,190  $20,797  $30,668  
Spirit Groups $0  $0  $0  $0  $18,304  $18,304  
Indirect Institutional Support $7,557  $5,700  $1,900  $32,300  $320,736  $368,193  
Medical $0  $0  $0  $0  $186,852  $186,852  
Memberships $950  $3,675  $4,440  $8,094  $7,794  $24,953  
Other Operating Expenses $143,038  $0  $15,669  $38,391  $363,071  $560,169  
Total Operating Expenses $1,922,321  $602,286  $573,746  $2,475,408  $2,438,171  $8,011,932  
 
Expense to Revenue Difference -1,243,774 -379,218 -546,035 -2,197,492 $3,988,818  -377,701 
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Table 2:  Schools in sample 
 
School Conference BCS Football 
Appalachian State Southern Conference No Yes 
Arizona State Pacific-10 Conference Yes Yes 
Auburn University Southeastern Conference Yes Yes 
Ball State Mid-American Conference No Yes 
Boise State Western Athletic Conference No Yes 
Bowling Green State Mid-American Conference No Yes 
California Poly State Big West Conference No Yes 
California State Big West Conference No No 
Central Connecticut State Northeast Conference No Yes 
Central Michigan University Mid-American Conference No Yes 
Clemson University Atlantic Coast Conference Yes Yes 
Cleveland State Horizon League No No 
Coastal Carolina University  Big South Conference No Yes 
College of Charleston Southern Conference No No 
College of William and Mary Colonial Athletic Association No Yes 
Colorado State Mountain West Conference No Yes 
East Carolina University Conference USA No Yes 
Eastern Illinois University  Ohio Valley Conference No Yes 
Eastern Kentucky University  Ohio Valley Conference No Yes 
Eastern Michigan University  Mid-American Conference No Yes 
Eastern Washington University  Big Sky Conference No Yes 
Florida Atlantic University  Sun Belt Conference No Yes 
Florida International University  Sun Belt Conference No Yes 
Florida State Atlantic Coast Conference Yes Yes 
Fresno State Western Athletic Conference No Yes 
George Mason University  Colonial Athletic Association No No 
Georgia Southern University  Southern Conference No Yes 
Georgia State Colonial Athletic Association No No 
Georgia Tech Atlantic Coast Conference Yes Yes 
Idaho State Big Sky Conference No Yes 
Illinois State Missouri Valley Conference No Yes 
Indiana State Missouri Valley Conference No Yes 
Indiana University Big Ten Conference Yes Yes 
Iowa State Big 12 Conference Yes Yes 
IU - Purdue University (Fort Wayne) The Summit League No No 
IU - Purdue University at Indianapolis The Summit League No No 
Jacksonville State Ohio Valley Conference No Yes 
  25 
James Madison University  Colonial Athletic Association No Yes 
Kansas State Big 12 Conference Yes Yes 
Kent State Mid-American Conference No Yes 
Lamar University  Southland Conference No No 
Long Beach State Big West Conference No No 
Louisiana State Southeastern Conference Yes Yes 
Louisiana Tech Western Athletic Conference No Yes 
Marshal University  Conference USA No Yes 
Miami University (Ohio) Mid-American Conference No Yes 
Michigan State Big Ten Conference Yes Yes 
Mississippi State Southeastern Conference Yes Yes 
Missouri State Missouri Valley Conference No Yes 
Montana State Big Sky Conference No Yes 
Morehead State Ohio Valley Conference No Yes 
Murray State Ohio Valley Conference No Yes 
New Mexico State Western Athletic Conference No Yes 
Nicholls State Southland Conference No Yes 
Norfolk State Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference No Yes 
North Carolina State Atlantic Coast Conference Yes Yes 
Northern Arizona University  Big Sky Conference No Yes 
Northwestern State Southland Conference No Yes 
Oakland University  The Summit League No No 
Ohio State Big Ten Conference Yes Yes 
Ohio University  Mid-American Conference No Yes 
Old Dominion University  Colonial Athletic Association No No 
Oregon State Pacific-10 Conference Yes Yes 
Purdue University  Big Ten Conference Yes Yes 
Rutgers Big East Conference Yes Yes 
Sacramento State Big Sky Conference No Yes 
Sam Houston State Southland Conference No Yes 
San Diego State Mountain West Conference No Yes 
San Jose State Western Athletic Conference No Yes 
Southeast Missouri State Ohio Valley Conference No Yes 
Southern Illinois University  Missouri Valley Conference No Yes 
State University of NY - Bringhamton America East Conference No No 
Stephen F. Austin State University  Southland Conference No Yes 
Texas A&M University  Big 12 Conference Yes Yes 
Texas State - San Marcos Southland Conference No Yes 
Texas Tech University  Big 12 Conference Yes Yes 
The Citadel Southern Conference No Yes 
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Toledo University  Mid-American Conference No Yes 
Towson State Colonial Athletic Association No Yes 
Troy State Sun Belt Conference No Yes 
University at Albany America East Conference No Yes 
University at Buffalo Mid-American Conference No Yes 
University of Akron Mid-American Conference No Yes 
University of Alabama - Birmingham  Conference USA No Yes 
University of Alabama - Tuscaloosa  Southeastern Conference Yes Yes 
University of Arizona  Pacific-10 Conference Yes Yes 
University of Arkansas  Southeastern Conference Yes Yes 
University of Arkansas - Little Rock  Sun Belt Conference No No 
University of Arkansas - Pine Bluff Southwestern Athletic Conference No Yes 
University of California-Berkeley Pacific-10 Conference Yes Yes 
University of California-Irvine Big West Conference No No 
University of California-Los Angeles Pacific-10 Conference Yes Yes 
University of California-Riverside Big West Conference No No 
University of California-Santa Barbara Big West Conference No No 
University of Central Florida Conference USA No Yes 
University of Cincinnati Big East Conference Yes Yes 
University of Colorado Big 12 Conference Yes Yes 
University of Connecticut Big East Conference Yes Yes 
University of Florida Southeastern Conference Yes Yes 
University of Georgia Southeastern Conference Yes Yes 
University of Hawaii Western Athletic Conference No Yes 
University of Houston Conference USA No Yes 
University of Idaho Western Athletic Conference No Yes 
University of Illinois Big Ten Conference Yes Yes 
University of Illinois-Chicago Horizon League No No 
University of Iowa Big Ten Conference Yes Yes 
University of Kansas Big 12 Conference Yes Yes 
University of Kentucky Southeastern Conference Yes Yes 
University of Louisiana-Lafayette Sun Belt Conference No Yes 
University of Louisiana-Monroe Sun Belt Conference No Yes 
University of Louisville Big East Conference Yes Yes 
University of Maine America East Conference No Yes 
University of Maryland Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference Yes Yes 
University of Maryland-Baltimore County America East Conference No No 
University of Maryland-Eastern Shore Atlantic Coast Conference No No 
University of Massachusetts Atlantic 10 Conference No Yes 
University of Memphis Conference USA No Yes 
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University of Michigan Big Ten Conference Yes Yes 
University of Minnesota Big Ten Conference Yes Yes 
University of Mississippi Southeastern Conference Yes Yes 
University of Missouri Big 12 Conference Yes Yes 
University of Missouri-Kansas City The Summit League No No 
University of Montana Big Sky Conference No Yes 
University of Nebraska Big 12 Conference Yes Yes 
University of Nevada Western Athletic Conference No Yes 
University of Nevada-Las Vegas Mountain West Conference No Yes 
University of New Hampshire America East Conference No Yes 
University of New Mexico Mountain West Conference No Yes 
University of North Carolina Atlantic Coast Conference Yes Yes 
University of North Carolina-Asheville Big South Conference No No 
University of North Carolina-Charlotte Atlantic 10 Conference No No 
University of North Carolina-Greensboro Southern Conference No No 
University of North Carolina-Wilmington Colonial Athletic Association No No 
University of North Texas Sun Belt Conference No Yes 
University of Northern Iowa Missouri Valley Conference No Yes 
University of Oregon Pacific-10 Conference Yes Yes 
University of Rhode Island Atlantic 10 Conference No Yes 
University of South Alabama Sun Belt Conference No No 
University of South Carolina Atlantic Sun Conference Yes Yes 
University of South Florida Big East Conference Yes Yes 
University of Southern Mississippi Conference USA No Yes 
University of Tennessee Southern Conference Yes Yes 
University of Texas Big 12 Conference Yes Yes 
University of Texas-Arlington Southland Conference No No 
University of Texas-El Paso Conference USA No Yes 
University of Texas-Pan American Independent No No 
University of Texas-San Antonio Southland Conference No No 
University of Utah Mountain West Conference No Yes 
University of Virginia Atlantic Coast Conference Yes Yes 
University of Washington Pacific-10 Conference Yes Yes 
University of Wisconsin Big Ten Conference Yes Yes 
University of Wisconsin-Green Bay Horizon League No No 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Horizon League No No 
University of Wyoming Mountain West Conference No Yes 
Utah State University Western Athletic Conference No Yes 
Utah Valley State College Independent No No 
Virginia Commonwealth University Colonial Athletic Association No No 
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Virginia Tech University Atlantic Coast Conference Yes Yes 
Washington State University Pacific-10 Conference Yes Yes 
West Virginia University Big East Conference Yes Yes 
Western Carolina University Southern Conference No Yes 
Western Illinois University The Summit League No Yes 
Western Kentucky University Sun Belt Conference No Yes 
Wichita State University Missouri Valley Conference No No 
Winthrop University Big South Conference No No 
Youngstown State University Horizon League No Yes 
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Table 3:  Total revenues less total expenses 
Average Profit/(Loss) 
 Football Men's 
Basketball 
Women's 
Basketball 
Total 
BCS Schools 11,019,708 3,714,375 (1,244,778) 1,913,605 
Non-BCS Schools (737,682) (97,199) (417,274) 209,326 
Non-BCS Schools (No 
Football) 
N/A (249,946) (393,974) (95,011) 
Total 3,804,946 1,042,541 (666,735) 670,596 
 
Number of Profitable Schools 
 Football Men's 
Basketball 
Women's 
Basketball 
Total Number of 
Schools 
BCS Schools 45 46 3 37 51 
Non-BCS Schools 20 30 12 59 81 
Non-BCS Schools (No 
Football) 
N/A 13 6 21 34 
Total 65 89 21 117 166 
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Table 4: Generated Revenues less total expenses 
Average Profit/(Loss) 
 Football Men's 
Basketball 
Women's 
Basketball 
Total 
BCS Schools 10,782,886 3,683,066 (1,339,599) (2,214,563) 
Non-BCS Schools (1,479,385) (335,991) (669,823) (7,716,253) 
Non-BCS Schools (No 
Football) 
N/A (578,936) (683,668) (5,802,761) 
Total 3,258,310 849,020 (878,433) (5,634,055) 
 
Number of Profitable Schools 
 Football Men's 
Basketball 
Women's 
Basketball 
Total Number of 
Schools 
BCS Schools 45 47 2 15 51 
Non-BCS Schools 6 13 2 0 81 
Non-BCS Schools (No 
Football) 
N/A 3 0 0 34 
Total 51 63 4 15 166 
 
 
  31 
 
Table 5:  Generated Revenues less contributions and total expenses 
Average Profit/(Loss) 
 Football Men's 
Basketball 
Women's 
Basketball 
Total 
BCS Schools 6,459,018 2,879,478 (1,599,743) (13,860,441) 
Non-BCS Schools (1,723,945) (457,486) (698,906) (9,234,404) 
Non-BCS Schools (No 
Football) 
N/A (629,084) (695,739) (6,560,890) 
Total 1,437,655 532,579 (975,020) (10,108,069) 
 
Number of Profitable Schools 
 Football Men's 
Basketball 
Women's 
Basketball 
Total Number of 
Schools 
BCS Schools 41 45 1 1 51 
Non-BCS Schools 5 9 0 0 81 
Non-BCS Schools (No 
Football) 
N/A 3 0 0 34 
Total 46 57 1 1 166 
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Table 6:  Generated revenues less expenses w/allocated non-program specific items 
Average Profit/(Loss) 
 Football Men's 
Basketball 
Women's 
Basketball 
Other Total 
BCS Schools 9,453,284 3,406,382 (1,580,699) (13,506,756) (2,214,563) 
Non-BCS Schools (1,956,924) (406,460) (737,636) (4,615,542) (7,716,253) 
Non-BCS Schools 
(No Football) 
N/A (678,572) (772,778) (4,345,706) (5,802,761) 
Total 2,451,566 709,221 (1,003,847) (7,291,912) (5,634,055) 
 
Number of Profitable Schools 
 Football Men's 
Basketball 
Women's 
Basketball 
Other Total Number of 
Schools 
BCS Schools 46 45 2 0 15 51 
Non-BCS Schools 3 9 1 0 0 81 
Non-BCS Schools 
(No Football) 
N/A 2 0 0 0 34 
Total 49 56 3 0 15 166 
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Table 7:  Generated revenues less expenses excluding student aid 
Average Profit/(Loss) 
 Football Men's 
Basketball 
Women's 
Basketball 
Other Total 
BCS Schools 12,698,494 3,998,707 (998,758) (4,155,408) 4,060,957 
Non-BCS Schools (391,532) (110,380) (443,750) (1,584,667) (4,494,767) 
Non-BCS Schools 
(No Football) 
N/A (335,679) (434,022) (1,429,422) (3,962,866) 
Total 3,710,296 1,105,905 (612,272) (2,342,676) (1,757,258) 
 
Number of Profitable Schools 
 Football Men's 
Basketball 
Women's 
Basketball 
Other Total Number of 
Schools 
BCS Schools 49 49 3 1 41 51 
Non-BCS Schools 16 20 1 0 3 81 
Non-BCS Schools 
(No Football) 
N/A 3 0 0 0 34 
Total 65 72 4 0 44 166 
 
 
 
